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ARTICLE
A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO
ZONING: WHAT'S WRONG
WITH EUCLID
RicHARD A. EpsTmIN*
I
Tim CONCEPruAL FRA mwom K
Today my topic is the relationship between the government
and the market with respect to property in general and land-use
regulation in particular. One central worry of our time is which
activities should be undertaken by government coercion, control,
or influence of one form or another, and which activities ought to
be left to decentralized private decisions of individuals, who, for
the most part, act rationally and steadily in their own self-inter-
est. This question has been a staple of political philosophy from
the beginning of our constitutional history to the present. It is an
issue that can be raised with respect to ordinary liberty and em-
ployment contracts, or, like today, with respect to property and
its use. Since a comprehensive discussion of this grand conflict
would be too abstract, I think it is instructive to cover one area,
in this case land-use planning, to see how it ties in with the gen-
eral controversy over public versus private regulation. By under-
standing this one case well, perhaps at some other time and on
some other occasion you can then figure out exactly how the
same considerations play out across the different subject-matter
areas.
A. The Owner of All You Survey
There are two preliminary questions to ask in thinking about
these abstract and broad relationships between government and
the individual: first, where do you start; and second, what kind of
hypothetical do you introduce in order to make your central
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of
Chicago. This essay is a revised version of a lecture given at a meeting of the
Federalist Society at New York University School of Law on April 25, 1995.
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point? The hypothetical that I like to use for land-use planning is
a very simple one. Let us suppose, somewhat weirdly, that you
own all of the land on the face of the earth. Any human interac-
tion between you and others who presumably, live on the same
planet is, for the moment, very much set to one side. Obviously,
this assumption is not realistic, but it is chosen to eliminate two
problems simultaneously: first, it eliminates all those meddle-
some problems of what happens to property at the boundary line
between persons, because we have no boundaries; second, it
eliminates the rather unpleasant question of what happens when
two people disagree. Now, there are, of course, some difficulties
with this example, but let us put those aside for now because we
will bring them back in later.
Now that you are ruler of all you survey, what do you want
to do with all the resources that are at your beck and call? The
obvious answer is to do anything you want. But while you are
never going to have to go to court to get your way, you are going
to have to decide two questions that combative lawyers often for-
get have to be addressed first about any kind of purposeful activ-
ity: what do you want to do and why do you want to do it? You
would say, in some sense, that you would like to maximize your
personal welfare, utility, or happiness. You would not talk about
wealth under these circumstances because wealth presupposes a
medium of exchange, and the idea of exchange in a solipsistic
universe would entail taking money from one of your pockets
and putting it into the other. So you are going to arrange matters
to maximize these objectives and thereby satisfy your appetites,
which can be as base or as noble as you choose. Whatever you
desire, you may do, subject to the material constraints that are
out there, such as the shape of the earth and the ordinary rules of
physics and chemistry.
When embarking on your course of conduct, you will dis-
cover that there are many things that you can do that will benefit
you in some particular way. But you will also learn that you are
not as free to act as you might suppose. You will quickly discover
that the moment you start to alter the material universe in one
respect, the consequences that. flow from your actions are not
necessarily limited to those you intended to bring about. You
must take into account other types of consequences, some of
which are known but unwelcome, and some of which are posi-
tively unanticipated. When you sit down to figure out whether
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you have done the right or the wrong things-when you make a
reckoning at the end of the day-you will be compelled to take
into account the unanticipated, the unwanted, the untaught, and
the unpleasant consequences of your actions, as well as the posi-
tive ones, even if no one else is around to remind you of your
folly or praise you for your wisdom.
Faced with that insistent reality, your maximization process
becomes rather more complicated than simply doing what you
want. It also includes gathering and interpreting information as
to all of the remote and indirect consequences, both positive and
negative, of your actions, and then setting a course of action to
maximize your anticipated advantage over all time and over all
states. You can not spend money in this world, but you can
spend-and waste-time and effort. So, even living in this solip-
sistic universe is more daunting than you might have initially sup-
posed, simply because you would have to make certain
calculations for survival: self-interest is a long way from self-in-
dulgence. You cannot afford to say, "Gee, now that I'm master
of the universe, I can do whatever I want in a promiscuous or
indiscriminate fashion."
B. A Shared World
How can we start to enrich this bare bones model in order to
come closer to the core issues of land-use planning? One way to
complicate this model is to assume that instead of an actual per-
son who owns the entire physical universe, it would be a legal
entity or association with two or more partners that owns the
universe. These partners have to decide what it is they want to
do with what they own in a world into which some measure of
personal conflict will necessarily intrude. But again, it is a world
in which there are no boundary questions because our partners
own everything in common.
To make matters worse, the problems that we just discussed
do not disappear just because new challenges have been intro-
duced. It is still necessary to try to value various states of the
world, and to figure out the indirect, unattended, unforeseen, or
unwanted consequences of various forms of human action. But
in addition, there is the obvious question of conflict and disagree-
ment: what happens when it turns out that the two individuals
have rather different evaluations of what they regard to be good
or bad in their world? These disagreements could be directed
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toward the desirability of certain ends, or to the likelihood that
they can be achieved, or to both. But once they come out in the
open, this happy partnership or association has to adopt some
form of decision-making procedure. It could be dictatorship of
the one over the many, or it could be some voting mechanism, or
it could be a quasi-market mechanism-though the last is diffi-
cult to introduce in the world of common ownership, since by
definition there are no property rights to facilitate exchange be-
tween people.
Technically speaking, as numbers increase, what is likely to
happen under these circumstances is a rising impulse toward par-
tition. That is, two individuals will have a dialogue that goes
something as follows:
A: You know, we can't figure out how the common manage-
ment game is going to work. We just have fundamental
disagreements; so you take the northern hemisphere, I'll
take the southern hemisphere, and each of us will figure
out what we're going to do in our own hemispheres.
B: There are several conflicts that remain. First, each of us
surrenders claims to half of the world in exchange for the
right to develop the other half with perhaps a little bit
more gusto than might have otherwise taken place. In ad-
dition, both of us recognize that there are going to be
some messy interactions at the boundary lines where the
activities on my side of the line are apt to have bad conse-
quences for activities on your side. Finally, in our parti-
tion agreement, we are going to have to figure out exactly
how to police these boundaries.
In our thought experiment, the moment two or more people
own land, the single world owner model becomes untenable be-
cause the collective decision processes needed to satisfy share-
holders, partners or whatever are all subject to a fundamental
constraint in all social "organizations: sometimes it is easier to
have boundaries that have to be policed rather than to govern by
collective rule. Stated another way, policing boundaries for sepa-
rate assets and setting up government organizations for common
assets both have their costs. One has to figure out ways to mini-
mize the sum of these costs.
So let us examine the costs of policing boundaries. When
the people focus on their partition arrangement, what sort of
agreement are they going to make with respect to these noisy
spillovers that are likely to take place at the boundary? One of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 5
HeinOnline  -- 5 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.  280 1996
WHAT'S WRONG WITH EUCLID
the tacks they could adopt is to ignore the boundary problem.
Obviously, they cannot do this completely. The moment there
are boundaries, the more important it is to have some rule of
trespass to regulate entry onto the other person's land (the com-
mon-law term of close is suggestive here). So right from the
start, there is a wall between the two pieces of land.
The trespass question may be the easiest question to solve,
and perhaps even the most important. But even with that said, a
good deal more work remains to be done-for not all spillovers,
as the term suggests, rise to the level of an actual entry. There
are many things that each person can do on his or her property
that will have negative effects beyond the property line. The re-
verse will also be true. In the old world in which you owned
everything, there was no such thing as an external consequence;
there were only future consequences. Everything damaged was
damaged for the one person who owned it. How should these
bad consequences be treated in a world of two people, particu-
larly where the negative spillovers exceed the positive gains? In
principle, both people would be happy if they could devise a
means to prevent them. In the easiest and most suggestive case,
where each hurts the other, the possibilities of improvement are
evident. By stopping a negative spillover effect of ten, each gets
rid of negative ten by reciprocity; at the same time, each sacri-
fices five. In adding the numbers together, it turns out each is
better off by five units (i.e., -10 to -5). Something similar to the
law of nuisance will be born to police interactions at the
boundary.
Next, suppose that we increase the number of people in the
world by a fairly substantial factor. As the numbers increase, the
obstacles to coordinated decision-making under common owner-
ship become yet more intractable. To correct for obstacles, the
people have to resort to more frequent divisions of property into
smaller pieces. What typically happens, therefore-this is of
course evident in.or near major cities-is that the ratio of bound-
ary lines to enclosed areas will increase. The more people that
live in a given region, the more these areas will shrink in some
way, shape, or form. The boundary questions that started out as
essentially minor adjustments in a two-person universe turn out
to raise an absolutely dominant problem in a universe with large
numbers of people.
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C. Action at the Boundary
What then do you do at the boundary? I think the first or-
der of business is to figure out what kinds of negative spillovers
the people want to stop; and these turn out to be the kinds ad-
dressed by the much-maligned law of nuisance in its traditional
common-law form. This body of law does not work on a moral
or deductive principle. Rather, it works on a rough empirical
generalization that will be false in some cases but true in most:
we should permit only those activities in which the benefits to the
land owner exceed the costs from dirt and filth to the neighbor.
One way in which we can think about this proposition is to
assume a small world in which I happen to own both a productive
resource and enough of the surrounding land, such that all the
pollution caused by this resource is going to take place on my
own property. We have to ask ourselves whether I, as a single
owner, will ignore that large amount of pollution when I engage
in my productive activity. Most of us will answer "no." It does
me no good to increase the productivity of my barns or my pens
if it turns out that I have fouled my field and destroyed my crops
and animals worth twenty or thirty times as much. I am not go-
ing to end. up making these self-destructive choices.
Once it is recognized how people act when the harmful con-
sequences are visited on their own property, it becomes clear
that the magnitude of the adverse consequences is not going to
shift radically when the damaged property is moved back. into the
hands of another individual. The law of nuisance is basically
born of the presumption that these non-trespassory spillovers are
the kinds of things that normally both of us would be better off
enjoining.
Our task is now to minimize the cost of two kinds of activity:
first, the coordination problems that we are trying to avoid; sec-
ond, the boundary problems that we necessarily have to face.
Typically, under these circumstances, the negative class of spil-
lovers with which one might be concerned is not necessarily lim-
ited to those things that pollute. There may be other kinds of
negative interactions between neighbors, such as whether to con-
struct a sheer wall on your side of the boundary line. It does not
take a modern belief in the welfare state to disallow such actions.
In fact, if you go back to any agricultural period-in England, the
basic rule has always been that every neighbor owns a reciprocal
negative easement over the land of others; one person cannot
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dig out his or her lands at the boundary so that a neighbor's land
topples, and vice versa. The basic logic is the same as before:
these mutual restrictions imposed at the boundary line will result
in mutual gain for all neighbors.
One issue that any sensible legal system has to worry about
is what happens if the idiosyncratic circumstances in a given case
move it sufficiently far from our well-perceived empirical norms,
such that some deviation from the well-established legal rule is
appropriate. Is there any way we can correct the idiosyncracies
that result from the application of the tort laws? At this particu-
lar point, it is critical to remember that the law of land use is not
only a part of the law of torts, but is also part of the law of prop-
erty. When two neighbors are stuck and the tort law does not
give them a very good solution to their private desires, we typi-
cally introduce the body of law known as the law of real cove-
nants, or covenants running with the land.
The full system of land-use planning starts with a nuisance
law-which operates as a general, all purpose, off-the-rack
term-and couples it with a series of contract or covenant rules
to allow corrections and deviations from the basic norm. This
allows a whole body of voluntary transactions to take place. For
example, if somebody's land is already a sev~er, it may well be
that it is easier to let a neighbor pollute it further at a price that
leaves both sides the better. The contract thus allows the two
parties to operate as one, and to divide the gains from the opera-
tion in a fashion that leaves neither unhappy and that results in
no additional burdens being cast on third parties.
The process, moreover, has no externally imposed stopping
point. If the value of land continues to rise, its segregation into
smaller and smaller parcels will continue apace. The need for
covenants to handle these distinctive, asymmetrical situations
will probably increase. As a rough generalization, the more in-
tensive the use of land,-the more complicated the covenant law to
adjust the position of neighbors along the boundary lines.
So far, this more robust model involves nuisance and cove-
nant law. Yet there is a third part of the model that may some-
times arise. By breaking up large problems, it is possible to get
rid of the obstacles of collective action and governance. But by
the same token, it is possible that you will be hoisted by your
own petard; almost inevitably, having little parcels of land helps
in making daily management decisions on each parcel of land,
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such as who sits at the dining room table, or who plays in the
fields. But this separation undermines coordination and manage-
ment in that land owners have to respond to global problems that
affect not only one or two parcels, but ten, fifty, a hundred, or
perhaps an entire range of a city. The result is the standard mar-
ket failure problem: large numbers of independent actors, all of
whom would be better off if they coordinated their behavior to-
ward a given solution, have an incentive to deviate unless the
others can be brought into line. As the numbers increase, bar-
gaining breakdowns become more frequent, costly, and difficult
to overcome.
The classic argument in favor of land-use planning is based
at root on some perception of market failure. The question is
how these failures are best addressed. Dealing with that problem
requires some guidance and constraint. Here the objective
should be to replicate the win/win outcomes of voluntary ex-
changes. In responding to a coordination problem, a state-co-
erced solution should leave each party better off, and in the same
proportion than before state coercion was imposed. Stated dif-
ferently, the set of outcomes that result from coerced exchanges
should imitate as much as possible those that derive from volun-
tary exchanges: namely, coerced exchanges should leave all par-
ticipants, including involuntary participants, better off than they
were before-after taking into account the full range of burdens
and benefits created by that legal intervention.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PAYOFF
By stating the point this way, you suddenly can see how a
basic approach to social interactions-starting with one person
owning everything and advancing to cases where many people
9wn many little things-ties in with the just compensation model
of the Constitution.1 One has to recognize that when autono-
mous individuals surrender rights to the use of their land, some-
thing has been taken from them, for which compensation ought
to be provided. One also has to recognize that the compensation
requirement does not necessarily demand that each person re-
ceive cash for the deprivation. All that is necessary is to generate
an outcome that provides benefits that all individuals can enjoy
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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to some extent. It is best to approach the problem of market
failure by conceiving of everybody as having something to sacri-
fice and receiving something in exchange. The social objective is
to induce those kinds of social exchanges from which everybody
will benefit.
I like to put the point in this particular fashion because it
illustrates the intimate 'connection between the standard defini-
tions of social welfare and the particular rules of land-use plan-
ning. The Epstein Constitution-which I think is basically the
one that is already there, so there is no claim of originality, but
only of devotion-holds that the law should allow the regulation
or redefinition of the standard common-law property right only
to the extent that, in the long run, it works to the average net
advantage of all persons subject to regulation.
Given this view, what happens in those parts of the universe
where some state initiative produces in aggregate a gain for the
society at large, but leaves some individuals worse off than
before? The answer is to equalize the benefits of the changed
situation, not by stopping the transformation from going forward,
but by making cash transfers from those who receive a dispropor-
tionate share of the gain to those individuals who are left worse
off, thereby restoring the balance. The model-which, under
some circumstances, allows you to find benefits from the implicit
in-kind benefits of government action-also has this correlative
proposition: when that condition of implicit in-kind compensa-
tion is not satisfied-and it may fail for many reasons, technical
or political-then compensation from winners to losers could im-
prove the overall situation by equalizing the gains across all per-
sons. Such a world would have some coercive government
action, but with a systematic application of the compensation re-
quirement to approximate the preferred distributional conse-
quences of voluntary exchanges.
The basic model of property rights articulated above tries to
take into account, systematically and comprehensively, all bene-
fits and costs to all individuals from government-initiated ex-
changes. How does this model compare with current law? What
is it about the present land-use situation that deviates from the
model?
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A. Euclid's Mistake A
The Just Compensation Clause2 allows private property to
be taken for public purposes of the sort that I have just discussed,
but demands the payment of just compensation to various indi-
viduals. To the extent that the basic model I have developed
seems to have all the elements that are found in the Just Com-
pensation Clause, one would expect that the legal response
would be the same as my theoretical model. Ironically, the result
has been exactly the opposite. Let me explain how this depar-
ture occurred and then explore whether anything can be done to
change the misguided results in the future.
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,3 the seminal land-use plan-
ning decision, the Supreme Court adopted a posture of deference
toward a comprehensive land-use ordinance enacted by well-
meaning local officials who were grappling with the difficult mat-
ters of projected interdependence in future land uses.4 After all,
regulating land-use requires dealing with neighbors, and while
neighbors may be able to move away from each other, land will
have to remain behind. The Court said that almost anything the
government wants to do in order to handle the externality ques-
tions is acceptable because the idea of nuisance is sufficiently pli-
able to allow virtually any form of government regulation to fall
within its ambit. Moreover, this presumption of deference is bol-
stered by imprecise common law terms: there is no clear demar-
cation separating nuisances, for which regulation is appropriate,
from ordinary activities, for which it is not.5 As a result, the
Court gave birth to a very powerful system of public planning
without asking what risks, if any, might be prevented by the ap-
plication of stricter scrutiny.
Euclid itself is suggestive of some lurking difficulties with
the Court's approach. The land in Euclid was a sixty-eight acre
parallelogram between Euclid Avenue on the south and the
Nickel Plate Railroad on the north.6 The land owner had assem-
bled vacant land and wanted to sell it for use as an industrial
plant.7 The Supreme Court upheld the Euclid zoning ordinance,8
2 Id
3 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4 Id at'388.
5 Id
6 Id. at 379.
7 Id at 384.
8 Id at 395.
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so that the land could not be used for the purpose for which it
had been assembled because even though Euclid had designated
the northern portion of the property for industrial use, Euclid
had zoned the southern portion of the property for residential
use.9 As a result of this particular action, the land's market value
diminished from approximately $700,000 as an integrated indus-
trial park to approximately $200,000 as fractured by the heavy-
handed regulation.10
Was this particular action justified in light of the problems
that we were worried about in our hypothetical universe--coor-
dination of multiple owners of a single plot of land and the exter-
nality problems in trying to maintain the boundary lines between
neighbors? Euclid fails to address these two concerns. First,
there should be no social concern with the ostensible externali-
ties that might arise among subsequent owners of the sixty-eight
acre plot when and if subdivided. On the particular facts, no sub-
division was going to be created at all; the owner wanted to use it
for an integrated purpose. Any gain from one portion of the
land that is offset by a loss on some other portion of the land will
be felt by the single land owner. The owner will pay the price if
its assembly lines are going to suffer from an inefficient configur-
ation. With such powerful private monitoring over these activi-
ties, government intervention is not needed to make sure that the
land is rightly configured for its own industrial purposes. Ironi-
cally, by breaking up a large parcel of land into inconsistent
zones slated for different uses, the regulation has created an ex-
ternality problem along the boundary between the different
zones, which is most acute when one zone is industrial and the
other is residential. Zoning can thus create the very externalities
that it is supposed to avoid.
Once you have these boundary conditions, you not only
have to police the interactions between neighbors of the old plot,
but you also have to worry about boundary problems between
the residents of the original sixty-eight acre plot and their neigh-
bors who live outside it. However, these two sets of people live
in different jurisdictions subject to different local planning
9 1d at 380-83.
10 1d at 384. Ironically, Euclid later rezoned all of the land owned by Am-
bler Realty Company for heavy industrial use. The site has been occupied by a
General Motors Plant since World War II. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VIou L
BEEN, LAND-USE CoNTRoLs: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. forthcoming
1998).
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boards. A truly comprehensive overview would take into consid-
eration whether the plan for the original sixty-eight acre plot in
town A is inconsistent with the plan for the land adjacent to it in
town B. In short, local governments, like private actors, do not
eliminate externalities. Rather, local governments create exter-
nalities as a consequence of operating in a hermetically sealed
environment; a decision made in one township translates only
with difficulty to what happens in the neighboring town. Trans-
action costs can bedevil governments just as they bedevil individ-
uals, since the people who decide on land use in Euclid do not
have to look beyond its borders to take their political cues. The
upshot is that the problems of boundaries and externalities are
not solved by zoning commissions. Indeed, zoning commissions
create more friction because instead of only one land owner ad-
justing his or her arrangements with another, there are two layers
of confusion: one between the two land owners and the other
between the governing bodies of the two separate jurisdictions.
Not only must neighbors come to their separate peace, but their
governing bodies must come to peace as well.
The problems of coordination and externalities do not re-
quire a zoning solution. The relevant question in each case is
whether government zoning aggravates or mitigates threatened
harms. The first zoning case thwarted the single ownership solu-
tion to coordination problems and further aggravated externality
problems that are a worry in any legal regime. Unfortunately,
there is good reason to suspect that zoning, as it is currently prac-
ticed, more often than not aggravates rather than mitigates coor-
dination and externality problems.
B. Euclid Today
The issue in Euclid carries over into the modem context.
Most of the really pitched battles before zoning boards involve
the future direction of undeveloped land. The endless veto pow-
ers given to immediate neighbors who suffer only minor financial
loss could have powerfully negative consequences for the larger
region of which that development is only a part. But political
separations can prevent those costs from being registered. De-
velopers have learned that buying land in small communities is a
risky business, precisely because extensive negotiations are nec-
essary to bring projects to fruition-projects that were stalled not
because of external risks, but because neighbors thought they
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could extract a pound of flesh from the developer. Just as zoning
boards can aggravate externality problems, so too can they ag-
gravate coordination problems as well.
It often happens, moreover, that developers who are burnt
once can learn something from the experience. One famous il-
lustration of the fickleness of boundaries is Disneyland. When
Disney built Disneyland in Anaheim, it acquired just enough
land for a theme park. The major winners of this investment
were the neighbors across the street whose property multiplied in
value by virtue of the improvements and advertisements by Dis-
ney, whose activities brought people from all over the country.
The neighbors bore none of the costs, but reaped substantial ben-
efits from this development. When Disney built Disney World in
Orlando, on the other hand, it purchased a huge plot of land with
hundreds of extra acres in order to limit the positive spillovers to
strangers. It worked, sort of. Disney kept more of the gain, but
the positive spillovers extended into a wider region and en-
couraged individuals to rent condominiums five miles from Dis-
ney World rather than across the street and drive to Disney
World. Disney encountered the same problem in Orlando as in
Anaheim, but in a somewhat less dramatic form.
There is a second odd feature of zoning that is worthy of
mention. In many ways the entire zoning process fundamentally
misunderstands the way in which individuals wish to integrate
and coordinate their activities. The clue to the difficulty lies in
the fact that the original meaning of the word "zone" implied
that every use inside a single zone was uniform in content. That
is why we have industrial zones, commercial zones, single family
zones, and multiple-family zones. This vision of the world pre-
supposes that identical uses within single zones are wonderful,
that mixed uses are to be discouraged, and, as noted, that the
problems with the zoned boundaries are to be ignored.
C. Mixed Uses
This is a monumentally rigid vision of how the world ought
to be organized. Although there is perhaps some local disadvan-
tage to having just one deviation from that particular pattern of
uses, there is a huge overall advantage. Do you allow one con-
venience store, for example, to exist within walking distance of a
large residential area? Yes. Do you want to have an uneven con-
centration of homes in a neighborhood so that some space can be
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reserved for park land, and so forth? Yes. The same people who
support zoning as a way to achieve convergent development have
to worry about the question of mixed uses. Given the strong pre-
sumptions in favor of zones, the variance looks like an excep-
tional grant, sought by someone who wants to deviate from the
normatively acceptable pattern of uses.
For all the superficial differences, the issue of mixed uses
raises the same problem faced in Euclid. In Euclid, the land had
to be sold to separate users. It was not kept for use as an indus-
trial plant. Nevertheless, the single owner can sell off the land
subject to covenants that can now be imposed at the front end as
part and parcel of the condition of the sale. For example, if a
seller wants to make a house far more attractive by laying out a
golf course next door, he or she promises to dedicate the land to
that use by covenant, and ensures that all buyers, present or fu-
ture, can benefit from that decision. Since in cases of mixed uses,
a seller can internalize gains and losses by covenant, why do we
need zoning boards to review the architectural design plans
whose impact, both visual and otherwise, is largely on the poten-
tial purchasers?
III
CONCLUSION: A RETURN TO LAIssEz-FAIRE?
We must understand how the alternatives to zoning work
before we can decide on its utility as a land-planning device.
Typically, people describe it in the wrong way. To give just one
example, perhaps the most gifted and influential writer on land
use, Robert Ellickson, wrote the now-classic article on alterna-
tives to zoning in 1973.1' When Bob and I discussed the issue, he
was puzzled as to what to call the common-law system. He de-
cided to call it a system of laissez-faire. As an unabashed devo-
tee of laissez-faire, I was concerned that his choice of title
suggested that, without zoning, individuals could do whatever
they wanted with their own land-which tends to underestimate
the role of nuisance law in this area. But he continued to use this
label nonetheless. That error, if it is an error, is harmless, so long
as one recognizes that the full system of nuisance and covenants
has enormous power. But it is also necessary to recognize that
11 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cii. L. REv. 681 (1973).
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many forms of land-use regulation could be justified on the
ground that they improve overall welfare without leaving any in-
dividual or group worse off. This just compensation element can-
not be ignored. The entire interplay of principles, therefore,
leads to a sophisticated set of rules whose overall strength is easy
to underestimate. The full legal system, as it is fully understood,
takes into account initial property rights, multiple uses, externali-
ties, internalities, coordination difficulties, covenants by way of
correction, single owners, and forced exchanges. Can zoning
provide an improvement to the common-law system in propor-
tion to its increase in costs and delay? I suspect that the answer
to this question is negative, and that we should here, as in other
areas, seek to find ways to clip the wings of zoning authorities.
Euclid set the inquiry off on the wrong track. It will now take a
good deal of hard work-intellectual, political, and legal-to cor-
rect the errant course of the past 70 years.
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